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In 1948 O. John Rogge, a prominent American liberal, was a contender for the Progressive 
Party’s vice-presidential nomination. He was then a man of the Left: an activist in the 
international peace movement, a champion of radical causes and a defender of organisations 
deemed subversive by the Department of Justice. In 1951 he persuaded his client to turn 
government witness in the Rosenberg espionage trial and was converted into ‘Rogge the Rat’ 
by his former allies. In tracing this transformation, this paper will argue that Rogge was 
neither a typical Cold War apostate nor a typical anti-Stalinist intellectual. Instead, his 
political trajectory was the outcome of a failed attempt to steer global politics away from 
Cold War dichotomies. The paper will therefore throw new light both on the movement to find 
a ‘third way’ between East and West, and on the phenomenon of non-communist Left activism 
during the early Cold War. 
 
An American historian recently remarked of Left liberal intellectuals that ‘because 
they were the sparkplugs of reform, the heart and soul of liberalism in America, the 
choices that activist intellectuals made during the early years of the Cold War were 
crucial to the history of postwar America’.i Frequently, one of the important choices 
made by American intellectuals was to join the anti-communist crusade. Despite their 
inchoate character and their propensity for in-fighting, most non-Stalinist intellectuals 
normally formed or joined anti-communist organisations such as American 
Intellectuals for Freedom, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom (CCL), or mobilised around core ideas such as Schlesinger’s 
‘vital center’ and publications such as The New Leader, Partisan Review or Daily 
Compass. The historical scholarship on such intellectuals is invariably framed by this 
feature. They are discussed in relation to their contribution to or role in these 
organisations and activities.ii Thus, the part played by individual activists in the anti-
communist politics of the early Cold War has generally been overlooked.iii This 
article seeks to fill, partially, that gap. The article also aims to contribute to an 
emerging Cold War literature that focuses not on the United States government and its 
agents but on non-governmental forces and private citizens groups that sought to 
influence the culture of the Cold War.iv With its emphasis on semi-autonomous 
actions by an anti-Stalinist intellectual, the article extends that historiography. The 
individual concerned is Oetje John Rogge. 
 Rogge was a New York lawyer with a high profile and an established record 
of activism in both legal and political circles. Despite the Rosenberg case, in which he 
defended Ethel Rosenberg’s brother, David Greenglass, and which assured him of 
celebrity status; despite W.E.B. Du Bois judging him to be a ‘national figure’;v and 
despite two historians’ assessment that he was ‘one of the country’s most prominent 
radical lawyers’,vi Rogge has been completely overlooked by biographers and 
escaped the attention of most Cold War scholars. Today he remains a forgotten figure 
in American history. An aim of this paper, therefore, is to rectify a significant 
historiographical deficiency. But there is a more compelling reason for focusing on 
Rogge: he provides us with an illuminating case study of American liberalism in the 
Cold War. Through him, we can begin to answer an important question: what political 
space could be occupied by liberal activists, such as Rogge, who chose neither 
Moscow nor Washington? This paper will argue that the experience of O. John Rogge 
reveals that, when McCarthyism was beginning to gouge the political landscape, there 
was in effect no room for manoeuvre permitted to those seeking dialogue between 
East and West. Notwithstanding the vast American literature on the Cold War, this 
issue has rarely been addressed and, even then, only in relation to Henry Wallace.vii 
Certainly, there have been important studies, covering the Cold War period, of 
individual American liberal intellectuals, including scientists such as J. Robert 
Oppenheimer and E. U. Condon, and scholars such as Sidney Hook and Lionel 
Trilling. However, none has emphasised or explicitly addressed how their subjects, 
like Rogge, attempted to uphold both political Leftism and Cold War 
anticommunism.viii
 Rogge also warrants scholarly attention for the same reasons that Orwell 
continues to attract biographers: both repudiated totalitarianism from the Left as well 
as the Right; both condemned Soviet as well as American imperialism; both remained 
committed social democrats working within but critical of the capitalist system; both 
attempted to find an independent path, a third way, through the geo-political and 
ideological minefields of the Cold War; and both became so disillusioned with, 
hostile to, or anxious about Stalinism that each was prepared to assist the State: in 
Rogge’s case, the US State Department; in Orwell’s case, the clandestine Information 
Research Department (IRD) within the British Foreign Office.ix And as with Orwell, 
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who remained on the Left but was applauded by the Right, we can ask of Rogge: 
where can such an individual be pinned on an ideological spectrum that was rapidly 
being re-drawn by Cold War imperatives?  
 Rogge presents us with a conundrum. If we examine the years before 1951, we 
discover Rogge’s long record of activity in or for the progressive Left. In 1947 Rogge 
became the defending attorney for the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee 
(JAFRC) when it was deemed a subversive organization and charged with contempt 
of Congress by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC).x He 
represented the labor leader Harold Christoffel through a series of trials also from 
1947 through to 1950.xi In 1948 Rogge served as defence counsel in the Smith Act 
prosecutions that eventually decapitated the Communist Party.  xii In 1949 he 
represented the National Federal Employees’ Defence Committee in its legal assault 
on Truman’s Executive Order 9835 - the loyalty-security program. Rogge’s political 
commitment in the late 1940s ran far deeper than his choice of legal briefs. In late 
1947, he joined the increasingly communist-dominated American Labor Party (ALP) 
led by the charismatic East Harlem congressman Vito Marcantonio. Rogge ran on its 
judicial slate in the 1948 elections and won sufficient votes (97,418) to split the 
Democratic vote which permitted the narrow election of the Republican candidate, 
George Frankenthaler. xiii He was a leading candidate for nomination as Henry 
Wallace’s running mate in the latter’s bid for presidency.xiv By 1949, he was both the 
New York State chairman of the Wallace for President Committee and a National 
Executive member of the Progressive Party that was formed in the summer of 1948.xv 
It is likely that the Wallace Progressive Party became communist-influenced, but not 
until its demise was it communist-dominated.xvi Yet the label of the latter was fixed 
early by the Truman administration and it stuck. But O. John Rogge deserted neither 
the Progressive Party nor Wallace, even when propaganda about its pro-communist 
leanings and about Wallace being a communist dupe, became insidious, systematic 
and effective.xvii  
 Significantly, Rogge assumed leading roles in three organisations that were 
clearly left-leaning or communist-dominated: the World Committee of Partisans for 
Peace (vice-president),xviii the National Lawyers’ Guild (vice-president) and the Civil 
Rights Congress, the legal arm of the Communist Party in racial equality cases.xix The 
latter picked up Rogge’s phrase, ‘Scottsboro – 1948’ in its championing of the 
‘Trenton Six’.xx He regularly attacked conspiracy indictments, the operation of the 
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loyalty boards, the Subversive Activities Control Board, J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, the 
serious erosion of civil liberties and the unconstitutionality of HUAC, which was 
‘consistently pushing us in the direction of a fascist police state’.xxi He even alleged 
that Middle Eastern oil, more than anti-communist ideology, was the main motivation 
for the Truman Doctrine.xxii And he continually alleged that the communist threat was 
a communist bogey:  
 
The Communist scare is a tremendous hoax which looms the threat of the 
American police state and the third world war…Insidiously, step by step, the 
enemies of our civil liberties have advanced behind [this] poisonous smoke-
screen.xxiii  
 
He was also in constant demand as a public speaker for Left causes. In early 1950, for 
example, Rogge spoke at a peace rally organised by the Joint Committee for Aid to 
Anti-Fascist Emigrants in New York.xxiv And communists took note of Rogge’s 
words. His prediction of a ‘dramatic round-up of dozens of Communist leaders and 
alleged fellow-travellers’xxv by the Justice Department - similar to the Palmer Raids in 
1919-20 - was the foundation for the Communist Party’s fateful decision to go 
underground in 1950.xxvi
 However, if we take 1951 as our reference point, Rogge can firmly attached to 
the Right. On 5 April 1951 Judge Irving R. Kaufman sentenced Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg to death. Crucial to their conviction was the testimony of Ethel’s brother, 
David Greenglass. Unlike the Rosenbergs, Greenglass confessed to espionage at Los 
Alamos, turned prosecution witness and was spared the electric chair. Representing 
Greenglass – and who, significantly, persuaded him to implicate the Rosenbergs – 
was Rogge.  According to one prosecutor, ‘most’ of the credit for the convictions rests 
with Rogge: ‘Without John Rogge there might not have been a successful 
prosecution. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Mr. Rogge broke the Rosenberg 
case.’xxvii Not only did he assist with the conviction of the Rosenbergs but also was 
himself a key prosecution witness. The occasion was the Truman government’s 
attempt in 1951 to prosecute W.E.B. Du Bois, America’s most prominent black 
intellectual, and his Communist Party associates in the Peace Information Center for 
failing to register as agents of a foreign power. Accordingly, Rogge was excoriated by 
the far Left. The journalist, I.F. Stone, accused him of ‘betrayal’ xxviii while the Daily 
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Worker journalist, Abner Berry, saw him as a ‘stool pigeon’ and a ‘renegade’.xxix  To 
Charles Howard, a black lawyer from Iowa and a member of the communist faction 
within the Progressive Party, Rogge was ‘the advocate of the slaveholder, Jefferson 
Davis, yes, and even of King George 111’. xxx Du Bois devoted an entire chapter to 
Rogge in his autobiographical work. The chapter title – ‘Oh! John Rogge’ – expressed 
its tone. He alleged that Rogge ‘hated Negroes’, was ‘an ambitious man…overborne 
by his sudden rise to notoriety’ and ‘like so many Americans, wanted money and a 
great deal of it’. He saved his most stinging epithet for the final sentence: ‘to Wallace 
the Weasel I now add, Rogge the Rat’.xxxi Equally damning was the assessment of 
Rogge by his former friend, Albert Kahn, for whom Rogge wrote the Introduction in 
his polemical Treason in Congress.xxxii Kahn wrote: ‘The case of Rogge may be of 
interest as a study in character degeneration. But its chief significance is not a matter 
of personality but of politics. Rogge demonstrates the development of a 
renegade’.xxxiii Kahn approvingly cited ‘a Negro woman’ who said of Rogge: ‘There 
walks a Judas, and a Judas walks alone’.xxxiv Rogge, then, was the quintessential 
apostate – a man who not only lost his way but who supped with the devil. He was to 
be condemned, not pitied. Condemnation continued for another thirty years: to Gus 
Hall, Rogge was ‘the provocateur and informer’ who was found beneath ‘slimy rocks’ 
from which he was ‘shovelled up’. xxxv Most recently, a senior KGB officer, to whom 
Julius Rosenberg and Klaus Fuchs reported, alleged that Rogge was a ‘CIA 
penetration agent in the special section for international organizations’.xxxvi
 It is through this contradiction of, on the one hand, Rogge speaking and acting 
on behalf of radical causes and, on the other, being fiercely attacked by the Left, that 
the major preoccupation of this paper emerges: the position of the non-doctrinaire, 
independent-minded progressive during the early Cold War. Rogge embodied this 
position. He believed he could carve out some middle ground for himself - and others 
- to occupy. But the polarities of the Cold War proved too extreme and all that 
remained was a desolate territory marked by political isolation and impotence. So 
Rogge’s case serves to highlight the dilemma confronting many American liberals 
from the late 1940s: either risk being tarred with the communist brush or embrace the 
anti-communist crusade. Rogge did neither. His experience thus provides us with a 
strong litmus test of the consequences of attempting to circumvent the Manichean 
framework of the Cold War. 
………………… 
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 But first, who was O. John Rogge and what was his pre-Cold War background? This 
background provides a distinct pointer to his later trajectory. Oetje John Rogge was 
born on a farm in Illinois on 12 October 1903 to German immigrants.xxxvii Until he 
entered school he spoke only ‘Low’ German. In 1922, this young man of nineteen, 
now six foot three inches tall, graduated from the University of Illinois. From there he 
began an exceptional academic career at Harvard Law School where he earned an 
LL.B in 1925 and edited the Harvard Law Review. He returned to Harvard during the 
Great Depression, completed a doctor of laws degree and, inspired by Felix 
Frankfurter, moved to Washington and became special counsel to a New Deal relief 
agency, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. After a series of successful cases he 
was promoted to assistant Attorney-General in the Justice Department’s Criminal 
Division. In 1939, he opened a wide-ranging probe into political corruption directed at 
the remnants of Huey Long’s Louisiana machine. Rogge won indictments and - 
according to an historian of Louisiana politics, Harnett Kane - ‘became a Paul Bunyan 
of the grand-jury system and the courtrooms of Louisiana’ cracking apart ‘more 
fortunes than the genius Huey himself’.xxxviii
 In 1940, Rogge gave two addresses – the first to a New England seminar on 
civil liberties; the second to the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union – that captured the 
essence of Rogge’s philosophical position. It needs to be noted that, although the 
United States had not yet entered World War 11, this was the period of the Nazi-
Soviet pact, when Western communist parties vehemently opposed any Allied 
involvement in the war and their legal proscription was either being mooted (as in the 
US and Great Britain) or had occurred (as in Australia)  
 
We can’t start suppressing doctrines we despise without suppressing 
legitimate protest…[I]n dealing with even confessedly subversive elements 
such as the Reds and militant fascists, as long as I have anything to say about 
criminal law policy there, the Department is not going to stretch  the existing 
sedition statutes to fit cases that do not meet the legal test of clear and present 
danger of revolutionary violence. For the same reason I oppose any proposal 
for new sedition legislation which does not meet that test.xxxix
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It is little wonder that the Left embraced Rogge. He also stated that insofar as the 
Justice Department’s Criminal Division had the power to prevent it, ‘we will not 
allow the alien or the radical to become victim of persecution; but we will not let such 
emotionally charged epithets as “witch hunters”, “red baiters”, or “persecutors” to 
deter us in our efforts to punish communists, fascists and aliens who flout our 
criminal laws’.xl  
 In 1943, Rogge became special assistant to Attorney-General Francis Biddle 
and assumed direction of the government’s wartime sedition case against thirty 
American pro-Nazis. This case ended in a mistrial when the presiding judge died. It 
also culminated in Rogge’s controversial dismissal, in October 1946, from the Justice 
Department by the new United States Attorney-General, Tom Clark, and apparently 
on orders from President Truman, when he publicised evidence he uncovered in 
Germany that linked the American Nazis with twenty four United States 
Congressmen.xli Rogge’s dedication to anti-fascism stretched back to 1940 when 
members of the Dies Committee judged his anti-Nazi remarks to be ‘Commy in 
tenor’.xlii After World War 11, it did not waver. He repeatedly and publicly 
emphasised the dangers of fascism in America: ‘I am more afraid of fascism than 
communism in America’; ‘fascism in America is masquerading under the name of 
nationalism’;  ‘fascism is not dead in the United States, it is simply reconverting’; and 
‘the fascist threat to democracy is greater now than at any time since 1932’.xliii Soon, 
he perceived Cold War attacks on the Hollywood Ten and American radicals 
generally as ‘incipient fascism’.xliv In 1949, he went as far as claiming that with the 
Truman administration, ‘we are getting fascism American style’.xlv
 Disillusioned with Truman’s administration, Rogge left Washington, dropped 
his Democratic Party affiliation, joined Marcantonio’s American Labor Party and 
entered private practice in New York.xlvi This last move prompted the Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee to request that he conduct its legal defence – a case that 
continued until 1950, when after numerous appeals conducted by Rogge, the entire 
Executive Committee was jailed for contempt of Congress.xlvii  
 Thus, before the Cold War commenced, it would appear that Rogge had 
developed some recognisable characteristics: he was strong-willed, even stubborn; he 
was forthright and ready to speak his mind without fear; his highly successful career 
was meteoric but there were setbacks; he had strongly-held principles regarding civil 
rights and the rule of law; and whilst politically opposed to both ‘the Reds’ (as he 
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termed them) and the extreme Right he remained committed to their right of free 
speech if the law were not transgressed. The abiding impression he gave one 
interviewer in 1978 was that he was ‘a strong and independent thinker, a very 
determined man’.xlviii These traits must be recognised if we are to understand his 
apparent apostasy during the Cold War, especially in regard to the international peace 
movement in the early 1950s.  
………………….. 
 
When an historian of the American Communist Party commented that the speech 
given by O. John Rogge to the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw in 
November 1950 ‘caused a scene of memorable proportions’, he was probably under-
estimating the impact.xlix For Rogge it was his crossing of the Rubicon. For 
communists and most ‘fellow-travellers’ within the peace movement, it was heresy.  
For anti-Soviet officials within the Foreign Office and State Department, it was a 
watershed. Before we examine his speech, its genesis needs to be traced. According to 
a highly detailed, HUAC-sponsored Report on the Communist “Peace” Offensive, 
there was neither warning nor reason: Rogge ‘regularly attended and supported 
international Communist “peace” gatherings’ and until November 1950 (when he was 
not re-elected) was a vice-chairman of the Permanent Committee of the World 
Congress of Partisans for Peace.  Thus, the Report noted, ‘for some unexplained 
reason, Rogge delivered a speech to this “peace” congress on November 19 in which 
he made a major break with the Communist Party “peace” line’.l The Information 
Research Department was more sensitive than HUAC to ideological nuances, and it 
was less surprised. It noted that ‘Rogge is an American citizen …[who] has at times 
taken an independent line and has criticised Moscow.’li
 The IRD was right. Rogge had steadily been moving towards the position he 
took in Warsaw since, at least, April 1949. Then, he attended a meeting of the World 
Congress of Partisans for Peace in Paris. According to a New York Herald Tribune 
correspondent present, delegates were ‘rudely awakened’ from their somnolence on 
the fourth day by O. John Rogge. He drew hisses and boos when he stated that the 
Soviet Union shared responsibility with the United States for the present state of 
world tension. True to his bi-partisanship, but uncharacteristic of the Soviet-
dominated peace movement since the Cominform’s ‘two-camp’ thesis was enunciated 
in late 1947, Rogge told the hostile audience that the communist countries ‘must learn 
 8
to live with the capitalist countries for each has its virtues and defects and each can 
learn from the other’. Moreover, ‘injustices and restrictions on the one side are 
matched by injustices and restrictions on the other’.  Rogge told the newspaper 
correspondent that this was the third such congress he had attended.lii 
Overwhelmingly, Rogge stated, each attacked the United States and ‘I don’t think 
that’s the way to peace’. He had shown the text of his speech to another member of 
the American delegation who advised him not to deliver it. But Rogge, being either 
stubborn or defiant, was undaunted: he knew what position he would take before the 
Congress opened and ‘[he] knew they wouldn’t like it’.liii
 Nevertheless, Rogge continued to use the peace platform to broadcast 
iconoclastic ideas. First, at the Continental Congress for Peace in Mexico City on 9 
September 1949, he again was critical of the Soviet Union. However, he also 
emphasised the suppression of civil liberty by the Truman administration and the path 
towards fascism that the United States was taking – evidenced, he said, by the fierce 
physical violence displayed by vigilantes at an outdoor concert at Peekskill, N.Y., the 
preceding week.liv Apparently Rogge had been bypassed by the organisers for the first 
three days of the Congress and then ‘allowed’ to speak.lv Second, Rogge travelled to 
the Kremlin and addressed the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on 8 March 1950. In 
his ‘personal plan for peace’, he proposed the establishment of a United Nations (UN) 
‘watchdog’ body that would have the power to conduct unlimited inspection of all 
atomic energy installations as well as all armed forces and military bases. This body 
would publish its findings regularly and thereby relieve all nations of the necessity for 
military intelligence and counterintelligence. This, in turn, would immediately end 
war tension and pave the way for general reduction of armaments and the turning of 
the world to peacetime pursuits.lvi  There is no report of the Soviet reaction to this 
unique proposal but judging from the vitriolic anti-American rhetoric of the other 
American delegate, artist Rockwell Kent, it is likely to have fallen on deaf ears. lvii In 
the same speech, grandiosely entitled ‘Moving the Mountains of Fear’, he again called 
for less denunciation and recrimination from both sides. 
 The Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress met in Stockholm ten 
days later and, as a vice-president, Rogge attended. The ‘two-camp’ line of the 
Cominform  had recently been replaced by the ‘peace offensive’ and in this context 
the Stockholm Appeal, which called for the outlawing of atomic weapons, was 
launched.lviii Rogge became one of the original sponsors in what proved to be a major 
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initiative of the peace movement: an astonishing 473 million signatures were 
collected internationally within five months.lix Stockholm was Rogge’s third 
opportunity to remain the bone in the throat of the Partisans for Peace.lx He developed 
his now-familiar refrain: that America and Russia must cease blaming each other for 
the ills of the world; that East and West must become trading partners; and that the 
UN must provide the framework for international cooperation. ‘Then’, he concluded 
with a rhetorical, if not naïve, flourish, ‘it will be possible for us to transform the face 
of the world, see our meadows in flower, reach new summits, discover undreamed of 
horizons and, while still alive, explore paradise as well as the earth’.lxi A clear 
harbinger of the direction Rogge was heading, as well as indicative of his 
fearlessness, was his open dissension at Stockholm with the president of the World 
Peace Congress, Professor Frederic Joliot-Curie.lxii The latter alleged that the rulers of 
the United States wanted to wage war; Rogge challenged this and repudiated Joliot-
Curie’s use of ‘warmongers’ and ‘bloodthirsty imperialists’ to describe American 
leaders. 
 The final occasion before the Warsaw Peace Congress at which Rogge 
contradicted the ‘party line’ was a Bureau meeting of the Partisans of Peace, held in 
Prague in mid-August 1950. He submitted three resolutions. The first proposed that 
the Stockholm Peace Appeal be significantly amended to outlaw ‘all aggression from 
whatever source and by whatever country’; with the United States in its sights, the 
existing Appeal condemned as ‘war criminals’ any country that made first use of the 
atom bomb. The second resolution called on the committee to readmit the Yugoslav 
delegation, expelled in October 1949 for allegedly preparing for aggression against its 
communist neighbours; and the third, that a commission be established that reported 
to the UN Security Council, and which mediated between both sides in the Korean 
war, now two months old.lxiii However, none of these resolutions was presented to the 
executive committee for consideration despite Joliot-Curie being given them by 
Rogge two days previously. lxiv Rogge was being frozen out. Although not evident to 
anyone then or since, or even necessarily from these resolutions, Korea and 
Yugoslavia were the primary catalysts for Rogge’s apparent ‘metamorhosis’lxv at 
Warsaw.  
 After the 1948 dispute between Stalin and Tito and the consequent expulsion 
of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the ejection of its representatives from the World 
Peace Congress Permanent Committee and the imposition of an economic and 
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diplomatic boycott, the Tito government was subjected to a barrage of toxic 
propaganda from the Soviet Union and its supporters. The Yugoslav government 
became a fascist conspiracy masterminded by imperialists to disrupt the socialist 
world. The term ‘fascist Tito clique’ entered the lexicon of all Western communist 
parties. A British Communist Party publication, for example, implausibly titled Tito’s 
Plot Against Europe, alleged that the ‘Tito clique’ were both ‘fascist’ and ‘agents of 
Anglo-American imperialism’, while the general secretary of the Spanish Communist 
Party, Dolores Ibarruri, argued that ‘Tito-ite agents – former Gestapo agents’ were 
assisting preparations ‘for a new aggressive war against the Soviet Union’. The 
Cominform’s publication, echoing the epithets of the 1930s Stalinist purges, referred 
to Titoists as ‘ jackals’ and a ‘contemptible gang of spies and assassins’.lxvi To 
independent thinkers on the Left, like Rogge, Jean Cassou and Konni Zilliacus, such 
invective – quite apart from its disingenuousness - was anathema.lxvii The three wrote 
a remarkably lucid and cogent twelve-page statement in which they defended the right 
of Yugoslavia to pursue its path of self-determination outside both the Soviet bloc and 
West.  
 
We have all three independently visited Yugoslavia since the outbreak of the 
conflict with the Soviet Union and have seen and heard enough while in that 
country to enable us to make up our minds on the situation. We have all three 
independently come to the conclusion that the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict raises 
issues of principle that go the heart of the controversy about the cold war and 
that cannot be neglected in making the case for peace.lxviii
 
They argued that the case of Yugoslavia was of ‘transcendent importance’ to the 
peace movement because it raised the fundamental issue of interference by a foreign 
power – in this case, ‘the power of the Soviet State…to coerce Yugoslavia into 
submission’. Just as they were opposed to the American policy of undermining 
communist parties through interference in the internal affairs of their respective 
countries, so Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia must be resisted. Without a ‘live-and-
let-live agreement’ between East and West, which the Yugoslavia situation 
epitomised, world peace would be impossible. They described Cominform 
propaganda - that Yugoslavia had become a military base of Anglo-American 
imperialism and was receiving arms and officers from the West - as ‘monstrous 
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inventions’ and ‘sinister’ in character. On the other hand, they judged Yugoslavia’s 
stand as ‘courageous’ and ‘praiseworthy’. Conveniently overlooking its role within 
the Cominform prior to its ex-communication, when it set the pace (with Soviet 
blessing) for intolerance and intransigence,lxix Rogge, Cassou and Zilliacus stated:  
 
In international affairs the Yugoslavia Government are opposed to blocs and 
alliances and take their stand on the U.N. Charter, particularly on the 
fundamental principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and 
peaceful settlement of all differences. They have not entered into any political 
or military commitments…[and] have pursued an independent policy at the 
United Nations, frequently making proposals of their own.lxx
 
 These were precisely the principles that Rogge stood for. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that he should embrace Yugoslavia. Nor was it surprising that, when he did, 
the full, unqualified spleen of the pro-Soviet Left would be aimed at him.lxxi There 
was, for example, ‘a lively scene’, according to a MI6 report, when, in London on 1 
June 1950, Paul Robeson became ‘embroiled’ with a Yugoslav press representative. 
Rogge intervened on behalf of the Yugoslav, whereupon Robeson, ‘in great anger’ 
declared both to be the ‘tools of fascist aggressors’.lxxii Such wrath confirmed Rogge 
in the righteousness of his judgement and propelled him towards a harder, more anti-
Soviet position. His close relationship with Yugoslavia was variously exemplified. 
First, he agreed to serve as legal counsel for Yugoslavia in the United States – hence 
the epithet, ‘Tito’s paid agent’. Second, when he visited the country and met with Tito 
in April 1950, he was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Law. Third, on 1 
November prior to the Second World Peace Congress, he visited his confidante in the 
State Department, Jesse MacKnight, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs. The basis of their friendship – correspondence was addressed ‘Dear Mac’ and 
‘Dear John’ - remains obscure, but given Rogge’s increasing isolation and the Truman 
administration’s ‘growing anxiety’ in late 1950 about ‘a dangerous escalation of the 
Cold War,’lxxiii it is perhaps not surprising that, as we shall see, each was willing to 
assist the other.  It also must be remembered, that in the United States as in Great 
Britain, as Wilford has suggested, ‘the lines between the worlds of government 
officials and private citizens – the state apparatus and civil society - were extremely 
blurred’, in the early Cold War.lxxiv So MacKnight met Rogge unofficially but made a 
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memorandum of their conversation. According to that memo, Rogge told MacKnight 
that the Yugoslavs had ‘urged him to attend the Sheffield meeting and speak out on 
the National independence line….Mr. Rogge said that this what Tito wanted’.lxxv
 The other catalyst was Korea. In Rogge’s view, the invasion of South Korea 
by North Korean and Chinese troops in June 1950 was wrong and the response by the 
US and the UN was right. But if the conflict were not to escalate into a third world 
war, it ‘must be settled through the United Nations, with the active participation of the 
Soviet Union and China as well as the Western powers’. Indeed, it seems highly 
plausible – given Rogge’s strong faith in the UN – that he was far more ready to 
proclaim the virtue of Western intervention in the Korean conflict because it occurred 
under the aegis of the UN. He also believed that Korea could become ‘the beginning 
of the end of the cold war by negotiations for a general settlement’.lxxvi He was 
therefore dismayed when the Soviet press, the CPUSA, the communist factions in 
both the Progressive Party and the American Labor Party, and – significantly – his 
own Permanent Committee of the Partisans of Peace, all condemned one side only: 
the United States. It was also frequently implied that the South invaded the North, not 
vice-versa and that North Korea bore no responsibility for the invasion. In all of 
Rogge’s numerous writings in 1949-50, which analysed the sources of Cold War 
tension and/or provided a variety of solutions to conflict, whether in Yugoslavia, 
Korea or between East and West generally, he always strove to be balanced and 
critical of both America and the Soviet Union. For instance, in his ‘Appeal to 
Moderates’, he stated: ‘The present power struggle is further complicated by a new 
wave of authoritarianism which is sweeping the earth. There is considerably more of 
it in the East than in the West, but under the influence of our own McCarthys and 
McCarrans we have started to develop our own brand of it’.lxxvii Thus, to Rogge the 
moral myopia of Stalin’s supporters, in which one side is absolved, the other 
condemned, was abhorrent.  
 In addition to the role of Yugoslavia and Korea in Rogge embracing anti-
Stalinism, there was also the alarming issue of atomic espionage. Given Rogge’s 
intense interest in the atom bomb since 1945,lxxviii as well as his defence of David 
Greenglass since June 1950, Rogge would not have been immune from this issue. 
There had already been several episodes in this interlocking story of actual or 
suspected espionage: the defection and sensational revelations of Igor Gouzenko in 
1945, the arrest of Allen Nunn May in 1946, HUAC and the Condon case in 1947-48, 
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and Congressional investigation of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1949. These 
alerted an increasingly nervous public to the possibility of scientists’ disloyalty and 
atomic espionage. But it was not until the Soviets’ successful nuclear detonation in 
September 1949 that anxiety became alarm. America may have possessed ideological 
righteousness, but it no longer had technological superiority: it had lost its atomic 
monopoly. Worse, some American and British scientists working on the Manhattan 
Project knowingly assisted this development. Incontrovertible evidence of a 
successful Soviet atomic spy ring at Los Alamos became apparent with the confession 
and arrest of Klaus Fuchs on 2 February 1950. As is well known, Fuchs’ confession 
led to the arrest of his American courier, Harry Gold, who, in turn, implicated David 
Greenglass. After a lengthy interrogation by the FBI, Greenglass confessed to 
espionage and was arrested on 16 June 1950. As his attorney, Rogge persuaded 
Greenglass to turn prosecution witness against his sister and brother-in-law, Ethel and 
Julius Rosenberg. Thus Rogge was very familiar with that defining landmark of the 
early Cold War, espionage, that contributed so heavily to the rising tide of domestic 
anti-communism. Although there is no extant record of Rogge’s views on the 
headline-grabbing Hiss case, the fact that Hiss was convicted on two counts of perjury 
in January 1950 (the statute of limitations had expired on espionage charges) may also 
have fuelled Rogge’s increasingly anti-Soviet posture at this time.  
 These, then, were the influences and events that shaped Rogge’s thinking as he 
crossed the Atlantic in November 1950. There were clear signs, already, that he was a 
maverick within the peace movement and, with his defence of Yugoslavia, his 
position on Korea, and his belief in the existence of Soviet spy rings, it was becoming 
apparent that his address to delegates in Warsaw would be certain to cause offence. 
As a State Department official later commented on this pre-Warsaw period, ‘Mr. 
Rogge conducted a one-man campaign inside the Partisans of Peace movement’.lxxix 
Soon, however, he became disillusioned. On 1 November he commented: ‘it was a 
pretty hopeless situation since the organisation [Partisans of Peace] had become…a 
hard-core Stalinist enterprise’.lxxx  
 
………………….. 
 
The Second World Peace Congress scheduled for 13-19 November 1950 was 
originally to be held in London before the British Peace Committee, unable to secure 
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a suitable venue, switched it to Sheffield.lxxxi It needs to be emphasised that this 
congress, far more than the first (held in Paris in April 1949), was of immense 
political significance in the developing Cold War. In order to appreciate why the 
Attlee Labour government subverted the Congress, we must understand how it was 
perceived – a perception that, increasingly, Rogge shared.  
 Hostility to the Congress hinged on the connection that existed between it, the 
Partisans of Peace and the Cominform. This link had been extensively researched and 
documented by the Foreign Office (and, in particular, by the IRD) with much of the 
prima facie evidence being provided by documents emanating from the Cominform 
itself.lxxxii
 
Frankly the position from the Foreign Office is this. The World Peace 
Campaign is nothing more than a Communist stunt, an instrument of Soviet 
foreign policy designed to stir up resistance to the Western defence 
programme and to the Atlantic Pact. It is run by Communists under direction 
from Moscow and is not to be regarded as a genuinely international peace 
movement of a democratic kind.lxxxiii  
 
That the early post-war peace movement was a creature of the Cominform was 
regarded as axiomatic; it was ‘a fact not needing further proof’.lxxxiv This view, when 
stripped of some of its Cold War clothing, is essentially correct: with the exception of 
Rogge, the Partisans of Peace (later reformulated as the World Peace Council) did 
desire peace but on Soviet terms. And it is a view shared by the pre-eminent historian 
of the peace movement of this period.lxxxv The claim of the British Peace Committee 
that it sought ‘solely to aid in the discovery of means whereby the present 
international tension may be reduced’ was therefore disingenuous.lxxxvi It certainly 
contrasts with the more bluntly expressed view of its mentor, the British Communist 
Party, on the centrality of peace activity to the political struggle.lxxxvii  
 The British government regarded the staging of the Peace Congress as a 
crucial dimension of the Soviet-sponsored ‘peace offensive’ that, thanks to the 
Stockholm Petition, the debate over German re-armament and the war in Korea, was 
burgeoning. The Soviets’ peace campaign was ‘a propagandist weapon of war’,lxxxviii 
and the World Peace Congress a means of ‘weakening the determination of the 
Western powers to build up their defences against Soviet pressure’.lxxxix In short, it 
 15
was ‘a Trojan Dove’.xc Because the peace offensive was ‘now regarded by the Soviet 
leaders as the most important and active task of World Communism, embracing all 
the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy’,xci it must be confronted aggressively by 
the West.  
 Such a response from the West would combat the projection of the World 
Peace Council as an effective rival, a political alternative, to the UN. With the 
outbreak of the Korean war, to which the UN was militarily committed, such a 
projection assumed immense significance. The fact that the timing of the Congress 
coincided (deliberately, in the view of the Foreign Office) with the meeting of the 
General Assembly of the UN, and that Congress resolutions were expected to 
synchronise with proposals put forward by the Soviet delegation to the UN on atomic 
disarmament, was a source of particular concern.xcii This concern cannot be under-
estimated, for that vexed question - with whom should the responsibility for 
preventing war and preserving peace reside: the fledgling United Nations or the 
embryonic World Peace Council? – then went to the core of Cold War geo-strategic 
politics. This question would be raised and answered by several speakers at the 
Warsaw Congress; Rogge, an ardent believer in the UN, had an opposite answer. 
From both sides of the ideological divide, therefore, the Congress was full of 
propaganda potential and political significance. In an important sense it was a crucible 
of what the Cold War was primarily about: the control and mobilisation of public 
opinion, at home and abroad.  
In this context the Labour government decided to cripple the Congress. As 
Prime Minister Attlee stated in a live BBC broadcast on the evening of 1 November,  
 
We are not willing to throw wide our doors to those who seek to come here to 
subvert our institutions, to seduce our fellow citizens from their natural 
allegiance and their daily duties and to make propaganda for those who call us 
‘cannibals and warmongers’.xciii
 
 So Britain closed its doors. Through an enlarged definition of persona non grata, 
which provided the quasi-legal basis for withholding visas, over two thirds of the 
foreign delegates and almost the entire foreign leadership of the Partisans for Peace 
were excluded. The Congress was decapitated. This was accomplished through 
duplicity, shrewd timing and effective execution.  It meant that at the last minute, the 
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British Peace Committee was forced to cancel the Congress.xciv The dove of peace 
flew east, to Warsaw. However, there was one desultory meeting, on the first 
scheduled day, 12 November, attended by a rump of local delegates and the small 
number of foreign delegates permitted entry. Rogge was one of these and he 
addressed that meeting. xcv  
 The only report of his speech was in the Sheffield Telegraph whose ‘special 
correspondent’ noted that ‘delegates shuffled in their seats’ when Rogge claimed that 
all the threats to world peace stemmed from two concentrations of power – a political 
concentration in the Soviet Union and an economic concentration in the United States.  
When he stated that he was ‘more disturbed’ by the former than the latter, the 
audience was ‘shocked’ but ‘decided to treat it as a lapse which was best 
overlooked’.xcvi No such forbearance was extended in Warsaw. In fact, Rogge went 
much further at Sheffield. We know this only because the text of his speech was 
cabled to the Voice Of America in New York. A copy of that cable is now located in 
State Department files. Part of it read: 
 
A second difficulty which flows from the fanatical zeal of Communists is that 
it tempts the Soviet Union, by equating progress with its policies, to seek to 
control progressive movements in other parts of the world with the result that 
progressive forces everywhere are being divided and destroyed…The 
Progressive Party in the United States, to which I still belong and which I tried 
to help build, has been committing political suicide because progressives do 
not feel as free to criticize relevent[sic] mistakes of the Soviet Union as those 
of their own country.xcvii
 
It is little wonder that delegates, most of whom would have been more sympathetic to 
the communist position, should shuffle in their seats. Discomfort was eased by acerbic 
mirth when a Soviet delegate, Boris Polevoy, stated that ‘everyone knows the Soviet 
people want peace. Anyone who doesn’t ought to be locked in a lunatic asylum’. 
According to the local press correspondent, he looked along the row towards Rogge 
with the result that ‘laughter and applause swept the hall’.xcviii The next day delegates 
left for Warsaw . 
 For Mrs Nan Green, an organising secretary of the Sheffield Congress, going 
to Warsaw was ‘like changing worlds, like stepping into the sun after being in the 
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rain’.xcix Flags, streamers and multi-coloured posters displaying Picasso’s peace dove 
decorated streets, shops, ports and railway stations. Large welcoming committees 
greeted the arriving delegates in Warsaw where, according to one report, ‘tremendous 
enthusiasm reigns’.c According to the British Daily Worker, ‘the Attlee ban has put a 
spotlight on the big British delegation, whose members have been warmly welcomed 
everywhere’. At one welcome, at the Warsaw railway station, speakers attacked ‘the 
London lackeys of Wall Street’ for preventing the Sheffield Congress.ci The New 
York Times correspondent described how ‘girls of 18 to 25 swarmed onto the platform 
as each train pulled in and handed bouquets to the delegates whilst army bands 
played.’cii The warm welcome would not be the only reason for delegates’ gratitude: 
they each received 500 złoty pocket money (and cigarettes by their bedside every 
night) in addition to all travel, dining, entertainment and accommodation costs being 
met by the Polish government. Whether this was beneficence or bribery is difficult to 
tell but, to the British Foreign Office, ‘it made clear for all the world to see that the 
thing was a Cominform racket’.ciii  
 The Congress was opened by Joliot-Curie at 7pm on 16 November in front of 
1756 delegates representing eighty one countries and 309 guests and observers.civ All 
the luminaries barred by the Attlee government – Pietro Nenni, Dimitri Shostakovich, 
Ilya Ehrenburg – were there. None of the Yugoslav delegates was credentialed. The 
venue was the unoccupied vast hall of the State printing works which had been 
transformed by the prodigious, round-the-clock efforts over four days by hundreds of 
Polish workmen.cv Huge pictures of Stalin, Beirut (the Polish President), Joliot-Curie 
and the now-ubiquitous white dove adorned the low hall. The slogan ‘Stalin is with 
us’ was displayed but, diplomatically perhaps, only in Polish. To those delegates from 
Western countries who were for the first time ‘experience[ing] a real people’s 
democracy’,cvi the rituals, quite different from what could be expected in Sheffield, 
would be a surprise. Between speeches, the Congress organisers regularly brought 
into the hall groups of dancing boys and girls dressed in peasant costumes who 
showered the delegates with posies of flowers. Members of the Polish communist 
youth organisation gave leading speakers gifts such as the head of Stalin in coal. After 
certain speeches, ‘Pokoj’, the Polish word for peace, was repeated rhythmically to 
clapping for many minutes. When Pak Den-Ai, the North Korean delegate, spoke – in 
Russian – delegates ‘rose as one man’ and cheered for a full ten minutes; when Mao 
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and Kim Il Sung were toasted, ‘again they rose to cheer until they could cheer no 
more’.cvii All this, for one young Australian delegate, was ‘intensely inspiring’, 
‘exhilarating’ and its lasting impression ‘indelible’.cviii  
 This, then, was the semi-revivalist, triumphalist atmosphere which Rogge 
faced when he took the lectern.  In contrast to the ecumenical spirit of the first major 
peace meeting he attended – at Wroclaw in August 1948, where ‘the representation 
was wide and there was much good will’cix – here, he was about to experience 
narrowness and intolerance. In large part, this reflected the rigidities of an 
increasingly chilly Cold War, but Rogge, as we have seen, had also changed. But 
what had not altered was his refusal to accept the ‘party line’, his single-minded 
determination to speak, as he saw it, the truth, no matter how unpalatable, no matter 
how hostile the audience. An assessment of Rogge ten years earlier as ‘forthright 
[and] frequently naïve’ remains apposite.cx
 Rogge was scheduled to speak on the third day of the Congress, in the 
morning session of 19 November. There had already been innumerable rousing 
speeches denouncing the American and British warmongers and the aggressive role of 
the UN – the ‘tool of the imperialists’ - in Korea. The perspectives, policies and peace 
initiatives of the ‘mighty bastion of peace’, the Soviet Union, were applauded. Nearly 
all received standing ovations. These speeches were widely reported and reprinted and 
will not be summarised here.cxi The concern expressed by one delegate, Elinor Burns, 
that ‘this was meant to be a peace conference not a communist conference’, would be 
voiced later, well after the Congress had concluded.cxii So Rogge was the first and 
only dissentient at Warsaw. Unlike his Sheffield speech, a copy of the full text of his 
Warsaw speech cannot be located. The following, therefore, is constructed from 
various press reports.cxiii
 After accusing communists of ‘displaying a fanatical missionary zeal,’ he 
declared: ‘Today I would not sign the Stockholm appeal’. He elaborated the policy of 
the Yugoslav government in refusing to join either the Western or Soviet power blocs. 
He directly addressed the Chinese delegates to whom he expressed his ‘earnest’ hope 
that Communist China would follow Yugoslavia’s example of independence. It is not 
clear whether he reiterated his Sheffield statement that the ‘New China’ should be 
recognised and become a member of the UN Security Council. cxiv However, he did 
refer to the enduring ‘traditional American-Chinese friendship’, which produced 
‘merriment in the hall’. He claimed that the communist belief in the use of force was 
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‘a roadblock in the path of human progress’. Cominform communists had already 
resorted to violence to convert the world to their point of view. In this context he 
referred not only to Korea but also the invasion of Tibet, the only speaker to do so. 
This invasion, he stated, called into question the sincerity of the principal supporters 
of the peace campaign. He denounced North Korean aggression and denied that the 
US desired war. He also argued that the communist domination of the peace 
movement would lead in its complete failure. ‘If we are truly partisans of peace, we 
cannot be the partisans of one nation alone’. He would not accept the Cominform 
position that progress must be identified with the policies of the Soviet Union. He 
attributed the decline of the American Progressive Party to its unwillingness to 
criticise mistakes of the Soviet Union as freely as those of the United States.  Finally, 
he urged the Congress to incorporate in its final recommendations a policy of broad 
exchange of ideas between the Russians and the Americans.  
 Although, according to a New York Times journalist present, Rogge ‘spoke 
with restraint in language that bore little resemblance to that used by the fiery Russian 
speakers to the congress,’cxv his address struck the audience like a thunderbolt. Many 
of the 2000 delegates loudly booed, jeered, mocked and interrupted throughout his 
forty minutes on the platform. The Czech chairperson, Mme. Hodinova-Spurna, was 
obliged to ‘shush the delegates to silence several times’. When Rogge finished, he 
received only a subdued ‘smattering of applause’.cxvi Such antipathy was quickly 
echoed by Pravda, which denounced him as a ‘tool of Titoism’.cxvii Moscow radio 
judged his speech to be ‘provocative’, and described Rogge as a money seeker with a 
‘divided soul’.cxviii
 After Rogge returned to the United States, he met MacKnight in Washington. 
The consequent memorandum of conversation, stamped ‘restricted’, reveals Rogge’s 
own assessment of reactions to his Sheffield and Warsaw speeches. On the one hand, 
he judged his contributions as ‘useful’. He believed ‘the news about what he had to 
say got around Warsaw and described various indications of its content being 
known’.cxix On the other hand, security precautions at Warsaw were ‘extremely 
strict’, which acted as a deterrent to potential supporters of his independent position: 
he had ‘no chance to talk with any of the Chinese delegates’ who were ‘instructed to 
stay away from him’. As noted earlier, Rogge hoped especially to steer them towards 
Yugoslavia and away from the Soviet Union. He noted that he had ‘no support’ from 
members of the American delegation, Dimitri Shostakowitch ‘avoided him 
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completely’, Ilya Ehrenburg was ‘very unfriendly’, and he was ‘very heavily 
attacked’ for his support of Tito. The extent of Rogge’s isolation was underscored by 
MacKnight asking Rogge whether he intended to participate in a report-back meeting 
in New York by American delegates from Warsaw. Rogge answered that ‘he had 
heard nothing about the meeting’.cxx Such deliberate marginalisation also had an 
administrative dimension. After the Warsaw Congress, the new Bureau (formerly 
Permanent Committee) of the World Peace Council (formerly Partisans of Peace) was 
elected. Rogge was not ‘elected’ – the outcomes of such elections were largely pre-
determined - either as a vice-president or as a member.cxxi Embittered and 
disillusioned with Soviet dominance, it appeared that – to use his own words – he had 
reached ‘the end of the road’.cxxii
 But not yet. Freezing out O. John Rogge from the ‘official’ peace movement 
did little to dampen his quest for alternative paths. He informed MacKnight that he 
intended writing an article on Warsaw for the New York Times Sunday Magazine. He 
sought MacKnight’s advice and, again, the importance of communist China can be 
discerned. MacKnight told Rogge that 
 
he might stress the long record of friendship by American so far as the 
Chinese people were concerned. I thought it might be useful if he spent some 
time on this and raised the question as to how much the new masters of China 
and their Kremlin friends were doing and had done for the Chinese people. I 
agreed to see if I could get a round-up of U.S. activity in assisting and sending 
it along to him.cxxiii
 
 Unfortunately for Rogge the New York Times rejected his article on the 
grounds that ‘it contained nothing new’.cxxiv  The other plausible explanation is that 
the date of its rejection - early January 1951 - coincided with a pivotal event in the 
Cold War: the massive, renewed offensive launched by communist Chinese troops in 
Korea. By the second week of January this military thrust was so successful that the 
possibility of UN and US forces being evacuated was canvassed. An article extolling 
US friendship with the Chinese people was simply not timely. However, an 
abbreviated version of Rogge’s article, without reference to China, was printed by The 
New Leader under the title ‘My New Plan For Peace’. He proposed a new, non-
communist, inclusive and broad-ranging peace organisation, Independent Americans 
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for Peace, which would organise peace meetings free from invective. He also 
proposed cultural exchange ‘of people, ideas and news’ between the Soviet bloc and 
the United States: a series of bridges that would straddle East and West. The article 
featured a photo of Rogge conferring with Tito and captioned ‘can there really be a 
middle ground?’cxxv The New Leader seems a curious outlet for Rogge. Aligned with 
the small Social Democratic Federation after the 1936 split in the American Socialist 
Party, it drifted to the Right in the 1940s under the influence of its executive editor, 
ex-Menshevik Samuel M. (Sol) Levitas.cxxvi Ex-Trotskyists, such as Melvyn J. Lasky, 
who became active in the launch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin in 
1950, cxxvii joined its ranks and it served as ‘campaign headquarters’ for various anti-
communist intellectuals.cxxviii Whilst Albert Kahn’s assessment of The New Leader as 
a ‘red-baiting journal’,cxxix may have under-estimated its social-democratic (but not 
anti-Stalinist) credentials, the fact that Rogge sent his piece to a relatively obscure 
paper whose editor distanced himself from Rogge, highlighted how limited his 
choices were.cxxx After no fewer than six iterations, Rogge’s short article was 
eventually transformed into a major twenty-six page document entitled ‘An Appeal to 
Moderates’. However, within the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, the 
reception was not favourable and it was never published.cxxxi By attempting to occupy 
‘the middle ground’ between Left and Right, East and West, in the early 1950s Rogge 
stood in an ideological no-man’s land: isolated, lonely and vulnerable. The paucity of 
allies had to be matched by an abundance of resilience.  
 Absence of self-doubt, as well resilience, were necessary for Rogge’s final 
foray into the politics of the peace movement. On 7 February 1951, the venerable 
eighty-two year old W.E.B. Du Bois - who had moved steadily to the extreme Left, 
partly under the influence of his Communist Party lover, Shirley Grahamcxxxii - was 
indicted and arraigned for ‘failure to register as agent of a foreign principle’. In other 
words, the Department of Justice sought to link the Peace Information Center (PIC), 
of which Bu Bois had been the chairman until it was dissolved in October 1950, with 
the World Peace Council and thereby with the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union.cxxxiii Du Bois and four white co-defendants faced a possible fine of $10,000 
each and a five year jail term. The PIC had been responsible for circulating the 
Stockholm Petition in 1950 and O. John Rogge was a foundation member and driving 
force. Now, controversially, he was to be prosecution’s star witness (or, less 
charitably, the ‘Star Stoolie’cxxxiv).  
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 In the interregnum between indictment and trial of W.E.B. Du Bois and the 
PIC, Rogge was characteristicly busy. He was still representing his client, David 
Greenglass, in appeals against Judge Kaufman’s fifteen year jail sentence in April; he 
addressed the International Association of Democratic Lawyers - inside which Rogge 
was ‘conducting a Tito operation against its Moscow line’cxxxv - in East Berlin in 
September; he attended the Yugoslav Peace Congress in Zagreb in October ; and 
commenced negotiations to represent Dr Elsie Field whose brothers, Noel and 
Hermann Field, had mysteriously disappeared in Eastern Europe in 1949.cxxxvi He also 
worked on two lengthy manuscripts: ‘In the Courts and in the Streets’, a copy of 
which he later sent Ruth Greenglass,cxxxvii and ‘The Accusatorial Versus the 
Inquisitional Method’, which was primarily a 220-page study of show trials in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 1933 until 1951.cxxxviii Neither was published. 
 The trial, which commenced in November after several protest 
demonstrations,cxxxix was a heated affair. Rogge and ex-Congressman Vito 
Marcantonio, which whom Rogge has been closely associated in the American Labor 
Party and who worked without fee as defence attorney for Du Bois,cxl clashed 
frequently. At one point, Rogge shouted over one of Marcantonio’s objections: ‘Its 
stated objective was to work for world peace …actually it was an agency of a foreign 
power’. Marcantonio replied that ‘Two people may have parallel views…That does 
not establish agency’. Ultimately, the District Judge, Matthew F. McGuire, dismissed 
the indictment: he told jurors that ‘we are not trying the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union’. cxli Rogge’s detractors were triumphant. The outcome of the trial was hailed 
as a ‘break-through victory for peace and civil liberties’cxlii – precisely those causes 
that Rogge had previously championed - and, in the words of I.F. Stone, the first 
‘stunning defeat’ for the Truman government since it commenced ‘the greatest witch-
hunt in modern times’ in 1947. cxliii It was now open season for spraying venom 
towards Rogge. In the Left press, he was labelled a stoolpigeon, a paid agent, a 
provocateur, a renegade and a traitor. As we saw earlier, Du Bois called him ‘Rogge 
the Rat’. In terms of activity in, on behalf of, or working against, the peace movement 
Rogge had finally reached ‘the end of the road’.  
 By 1952, Rogge had ceased being the lone ranger conducting his ‘one-man 
campaign’, as MacKnight put it, against communist domination of the international 
peace movement. Along with his New York legal partner, Hebert J. Fabricant, he 
immersed himself in a plethora of lawsuits, many concerned with defending freedom 
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of expression against impositions of censorship. During the 1960s and 1970s Rogge 
filed numerous legal briefs on behalf of the poor and minority groups. He campaigned 
for equal rights for women and argued passionately in favour of the absolute right to 
freedom of speech. And he kept writing: Why Men Confess (in which his most famous 
client, Greenglass, was not mentioned) appeared in 1959; The First and the Fifth: 
With Some Excursions into Others in 1960; The Official German Report: Nazi 
Penetration, 1924-1942 in 1961; and Obscenity Litigation in Ten American 
Jurisprudence Trials in 1965. He was also a prolific contributor to edited books and 
to law journals. And he continued adhering to the main tenets of his most significant 
work, Our Vanishing Civil Liberties.  
 Those tempestuous, intensely polarised three years, from 1949 to 1951, 
provide a stark historical reminder of the difficulties, for individuals such as Rogge, in 
identifying with an independent ideological position. Despite becoming gradually 
embittered by the Soviets’ role in the peace movement, Rogge was not an archetypal 
liberal anti-communist. He did not follow the route of those New York intellectuals 
such as Lasky or Sidney Hook in the CCF, or any other formal anti-Stalinist 
grouping.cxliv He never supported the ‘pit-bull brand of political activism’ of the 
ADA.cxlv He did not fit either category of Hook’s typologising of the non-communist 
New York intellectual.cxlvi He did not subscribe to the liberals’ core beliefs on Cold 
War internal security, despite their origins in the anti-Nazi procedures instituted by 
Roosevelt.cxlvii And nor was he tempted to emulate the full-blown ‘conversions’ of 
Louis Budenz or Whittaker Chambers, although his testimony against the PIC carried 
some traces of the apostate.cxlviii  
 Yet he was not entirely alone. In attempting to locate Rogge within an 
international framework, his support for the independent line of Yugoslavia after 1948 
places him alongside Aldo Cucchi and Valdo Magnani, both of whom clashed with 
the Italian Communist Party for defending Tito. It also allied him with the pro-
Yugoslav British MP expelled from the Labour Party, Konni Zilliacus. Rogge was 
expelled from the World Peace Council but not from the American Progressive Party 
whose increasingly marginalised figurehead, Henry Wallace, he continued to support. 
Within a domestic context, it is initially tempting to locate Rogge within that 
ideological consensus which, by 1949, had been built around ideas brought together in 
The Vital Center by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. The term ‘vital center’ became shorthand 
for the liberal anti-communism that emerged in the late 1940s. In large measure 
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Rogge subscribed to its central tenets.cxlix But politically they took root within the 
Democratic Party. Rogge stayed with the Progressives, who continued to believe in 
co-existence over containment and whose descent into oblivion had been accelerated 
by the dominance of vital center thinking. Rogge’s answer to this dilemma was to 
strike out alone. Like the individualistic Orwell, he was not willing to soil his hands in 
the minutiae of grass-roots political activity in order to mobilise support. He thought 
his words would suffice. Other than MacKnight from the State Department he 
developed few political allies, local or international, and built no support base within 
the Partisans of Peace that would have given his ‘one man campaign’ greater 
influence. So, on the world stage, his imaginative proposals for resolving Cold War 
conflict and, within the United States, his potentially appealing Independent 
Americans for Peace, remained stillborn. But for all Rogge’s naivety or hubris, his 
political impotence remains a striking testimony to the hegemony of bi-polar 
assumptions that strangled all attempts to find a third way. His isolation, in short, was 
indicative of the triumph of vital center liberalism over Progressive liberalism. The 
decisiveness of that victory contributed to the inability of the Left, until the Vietnam 
war, to mount an effective challenge to the Cold War anti-communist consensus.   
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